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What is good for big business need not generally advance a country’s overall economy. Big business
turnover correlates with rising income, productivity, and (in high income countries) faster capital
accumulation; consistent with Schumpeter’s (1912) creative destruction and recent formalizations
like Aghion and Howitt (1992). Turnover appears to “cause” growth; and disappearing behemoths,
more than rising stars, drive our results. Stronger findings suggest more intense creative destruction
in countries with higher incomes, as well as those with smaller governments, Common Law courts,
smaller banking systems, stronger shareholder rights, and more open economies. Only the last
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Big Business Stability and Economic Growth:   
Is What’s Good for General Motors Good for America? 
 
1.  Introduction 
National  economies  have  landmark  corporations.    Maersk  shipping  symbolizes  Denmark’s 
maritime history, as Nokia marks Finland’s success in the “new economy.”  Many, often the 
principals of such great businesses, link an economy’s fortunes to those of its landmark firms.  
Most famously, Charles Wilson, Chairman of the now financially shaky GM, proclaimed, “What 
is good for the country is good for General Motors and vice versa.”   
A  positive  link  might  reflect  large  corporations  prospering  because  they  are  well 
managed  and  the  wealth  they  create  for  all  their  stakeholders  spills  over  to  the  rest  of  the 
economy.  Schumpeter (1942), Romer (1986) and others argue that large, quasi-monopolistic 
firms  create  and  finance  the  innovation  that  fuels  economic  growth.    This  is  because  large, 
dominant businesses can afford to innovate continuously, sustaining both their dominance and 
their economy’s growth.  Schumpeter (1942) adds that such stability provides job security, which 
Holmstrom (1989) argues permits high risk-high return undertakings, including investments in 
firm-specific human capital that would be unacceptable career risks to managers and employees 
in smaller firms.  A positive feedback ensues, with the dominance of large businesses enhancing 
their stability, which further heightens their dominance.  More generally, Caves (1982), D'Cruz 
and Rugman (2000) and others suggest large business enterprises coordinate the creation and 
capture of various economies of scale and scope.   
But  other  plausible  arguments  link  the  continuous  dominance  of  large  businesses  to 
economy stagnation.  Schumpeter (1912), Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), Aghion et al. (1999), 
and others link innovation per se to the turnover of dominant businesses, making the continuous   2 
dominance of a cadre of great businesses a symptom of stagnation.  Nelson and Winter (1982) 
visualize firms as collections of “routines” that develop slowly and resist change.  Routines let 
firms  prosper  if  they  fit  current  economic  conditions  –  institutional  constraints,  consumer 
preferences and production technologies.  But as conditions change, upstarts with new routines 
displace past winners that cannot change their ways.  Krueger (1974), Helpman and Grossman 
(2002), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005), and others argue that 
large established firms invest political rent-seeking, manipulating their economies’ institutions to 
lock in the status quo and block upstarts.  This maintains their dominance at the expense of their 
economy’s growth.  Or, welfare maximizing governments might lock in the status quo if voters 
genuinely prefer slow stable growth to faster but more chaotic growth (Roe, 2003).    
Despite their fundamental importance, little empirical work explores these theories.  In 
part, this may be because they apply to what Shumpeter (1942) calls the “very long run” – time 
measured in generations, not years.  Clear empirical tests require reliable data over a sufficiently 
long term for a sufficient number of economies.   
  This paper is a first pass at relating large business turnover to long-run growth.  We 
measure the stability of the largest businesses in 44 countries over 1975 to 1996.  We use this 
period because it includes the first and last years for which we had comparable lists of leading 
businesses when we began this project.  We relate these indexes to long run growth at the end of 
this  window,  gauged  by  real  per  capita  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  growth,  capital 
accumulation, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth from 1990 to 2000.  A ten-year window 
smoothes business cycle and transient crisis effects.   
  Economies  with  less  persistently  dominant  large  businesses  grow  faster  than  other   3 
countries with the same initial per capita GDP, level of education, and capital stock.
1  This 
reflects faster productivity growth and capital accumulation, with the former more significant.  
For richer countries, the waning of large old private sector businesses drives the result.  For 
poorer countries, the waning of one-time state own enterprises underlies our findings.   
  A low turnover of dominant businesses is related to high government spending, high 
regulatory barriers to entry, Civil Code legal systems, bank-centered financial systems, weak 
outside shareholder protection, and trade or capital barriers.  These factors play a role in linking 
big business turnover to economy growth.  Nonetheless, big business turnover unrelated to these 
factors still correlates with growth, especially in low-income countries.    
  Section 2 reviews the construction of our key variables and section 3 presents our key 
results.    Section  4  considers  possible  political and  economic  explanations  of  the  findings  in 
section 3.  Section 5 considers causality issues.  Section 6 concludes.  
   
2.  Data and Variables 
This section describes the raw data used to construct our big business stability indexes.  It then 
explains the indexes themselves, the  growth measures  and the other variables central to our 
empirical tests.   
 
2.1  Big Business Sector Data 
Our  data  are  hand-collected  from  the  1978  and  1998/99  editions  of  Dun  &  Bradstreet' s 
Principals of International Business.  We use this source because it includes a wide spectrum of 
businesses: privately held companies, publicly held companies, cooperatives, and state controlled 
                                                 
1 Note that the question of large firm stability is separate from that of optimal firm size. Acs et al. (1999) find that   4 
enterprises (S.C.E.s).
2  This circumvents sample selection problems due to stock exchanges, and 
hence listed firms, being less important in some countries than others.  Comparisons with annual 
reports show the 1978 volume to contain mainly 1975 figures, so we call this 1975 data.  The 
1998/99 volume generally contains 1996 figures, so we call it 1996 data.   
Our final sample of 44 countries, listed in Table 1, meets the following criteria.   
1.    The  country  must  appear  in  both  the  1978  and  1998/99  editions  of  Principals  of 
International Business.  This eliminates transition economies.  
2.    We delete small economies whose tenth largest company has fewer than 500 employees 
and which have less than ten companies whose labor forces are listed in both editions.  This 
removes microstate economies, which may differ fundamentally from larger countries.   
3.    We drop countries involved in major wars, including civil wars, between 1975 and 1996. 
4.    We  require  data  on  education  and  capital  assets  because  these  initial  conditions  are 
known to affect economy growth, and are needed as controls in our regressions.  
5.    We require comparable national income accounts data to construct comparable economic 
growth measures.  This limits us to countries included in the Penn World Tables.    
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2  Measuring the Stability of Leading Businesses   
We first need a list of each country’s top businesses in each of 1975 and 1996. La Porta et al. 
(1999a), Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and others show that large businesses 
                                                                                                                                                             
US industries containing larger firms show evidence of faster productivity growth.  Rapid turnover of large firms 
need not imply a steady state characterized by a preponderance of small firms. 
2 We use the term state controlled enterprise (S.C.E.) rather than state owned enterprise (S.O.E.) because the state 
may hold a control block without owning the firm outright.   5 
in many countries, the US and UK being notable exceptions, are not single firms but business 
groups – constellations of listed corporations tied together by equity control blocks and usually 
all  ultimately  controlled  by  a  single  wealthy  individual  or  family.    We  therefore  define  a 
country’s largest businesses as its largest firms or business groups.   
We start with the list of businesses in Dun & Bradstreet, and conduct an extensive search 
to determine ultimate controlling shareholder of each firm.  We then consolidate affiliated firms 
into  corporate  groups  accordingly.    To  do  this,  we  search  Google,  online  databases  such  as 
Hoover’s  online,  corporate  websites,  Worldscope,  SDC,  Forbes’  annual  lists  of  billionaires, 
newspaper archives, case studies, and academic research papers. We define a firm as controlled 
if it is so defined in any of these sources, or if 20% or more of its stock is voted by a firm, 
wealthy family, government, trust, or bank.
3    
We define a business’s size as the number of people it employs.  For business groups, this 
is  the  total  number  of  employees  in  all  the  group’s  component  firms.  Employee  tallies  for 
business  groups  are  cross-checked  whenever  possible  across  the  various  sources  
mentioned earlier.  We measure firm size by employees because this lets us include both listed 
and  private  firms.    The  latter  typically  do  not  disclose  their  assets  or  sales,  other  common 
measures of firm size.   
The consolidation of firms into business groups leaves some countries, like Sweden and 
South Africa, with a very few very large dominant businesses.  Thus, even the 15
th or 20
th largest 
business in some countries is quite small.  We therefore define each country’s big business sector 
as its 10 largest businesses.  If ties occur for the tenth business, all the ties are included.   
                                                 
3 La Porta et al. (1999a) shows that 51% is not necessary as a single dominant shareholder can exert effective control 
when all other shareholders are small. We use voting rights to assign control, for cash flow rights and voting rights 
diverge substantially in some countries because of dual share classes and control pyramids.     6 
In smaller countries, or countries with business groups rather than freestanding firms, this 
is an exhaustive list of large businesses.  In larger economies, it is a sampling of big businesses 
biased towards the biggest. For a very small economy, even the top ten list can still include what 
would be considered “small firms” in larger countries. This necessitates controlling for country 
size, or for the importance of the top ten firms relative to the economy, in subsequent analyses.  
The next issue is what sorts of businesses to include.  We exclude enterprises that are not 
normally included in countries’ private sectors: educational services (SIC: 82), health services 
(SIC:  80),  membership  organizations  (SIC:  86),  noncommercial  research  organizations  (SIC: 
8733), and government agencies (SIC: 91-97).  Beyond this, a degree of judgment is inevitable, 
for excluding any or all of three other categories of businesses might also be reasonable. 
  Financial sector businesses might be excluded.  King and Levine (1993) show that capital 
market development positively affects growth.  Including financial businesses in our top ten list 
might  capture  spuriously  the  impact  of  financial  system  development  on  growth.    Business 
groups containing financial and non-financial firms are assigned to one category that accounts 
for the greater share of their employees.   
  Foreign owned enterprises might be excluded.  Multinational subsidiaries are plausibly 
more affected by global conditions than by their host countries’ economic conditions.  However, 
some domestically based businesses might also have foreign operations, so this argument is not 
clear-cut.  Countries that open up to the global economy gain multinational subsidiaries, and 
countries that isolate themselves lose multinational subsidiaries.  Either could alter their top ten 
lists.  Sachs and Warner (1995) and others show that openness contributes to economic growth 
and global convergence.  Hence, including foreign owned enterprises might capture spuriously 
the impact of openness on growth.       7 
  Any enterprise that was state controlled for any part of our window might be excluded.  
S.C.E.s  economic  motives  might  differ  from  those  of  purely  ‘for-profit’  businesses.    These 
motives  might  range  from  the  efficient  provision  of  public  goods  and  promotion  of  new 
industries to wasteful government activism, bureaucratic entrenchment, and blatant corruption.  
These motives aggregate to an uncertain effect on growth; though Hayek (1944) and others argue 
eloquently that their net effect is negative.   Regardless of the sign, including S.C.E.s might 
capture spuriously the impact of the size of the government on growth.  Since import substitution 
and  socialist  ideologies  induced  extensive  nationalizations  in  the  1970s  and  a  resurgence  of 
liberal ideology in the 1990s induced waves of privatizations, this problem may be especially 
severe during our time window.   
  To deal with these issues, we construct several alternative lists of top ten businesses in 
1975, and again in 1996: 
￿  List I – Includes all businesses:  financial and non-financial, domestically controlled and 
foreign  controlled,  as  well  as  private  sector  and  state  controlled.    Privatizations  and 
nationalizations are taken as continuations of the same business, but S.C.E.s that fail, are 
taken over, or are broken up are classified as not surviving.   
￿  List II – List I, but excluding businesses primarily the financial sector – banks, insurance 
companies, and investment banks.  We define the financial sector as SIC codes 60 – 64, 
as reported in Dunn and Bradstreet’s Principals of International Business. 
￿  List III – List II, but excluding foreign controlled enterprises.  We infer foreign control if 
a foreign person votes at least a twenty percent stake and is the largest shareholder.   
￿  List IV – List II, but excluding S.C.E.s.  We consider an enterprise to be state controlled 
if a government holds at least a twenty percent voting stake and is the largest shareholder.     8 
￿  List V – The intersection of Lists III and IV; that is, list I excluding financial companies, 
S.C.E.s, and foreign controlled enterprises.  
  We  wish  to  see  if  economic  growth  is  related  to  the  stability  of  a  country’s  largest 
businesses.  To quantify this, we must define which leading businesses from 1975 remain stable 
as leading businesses through 1996.  One obvious approach is to define stable as “still in the top 
ten list in 1996”.  But a growing economy might let new businesses join the top ten, even though 
the 1975 top ten still prosper.  A more nuanced definition of stability might spotlight 1975 top 
ten businesses that grew at least as fast as GDP, regardless of the 1996 top ten list.  Other 
alternatives might define stability as a 1975 top ten business retaining at least n percent of its 
1975  labor  force,  where  n  can  be  e.g.  50%,  25%,  or  10%.    A  combined  definition  might 
designate a top 1975 business as stable if it is either in the 1996 top ten list or it grew (or shrank) 
at some minimal rate from 1975 to 1996.  While each definition is arbitrary in some respect, 
robustness checks discussed below show that all yield similar empirical results.   
  In the tables, we use a combined definition – a leading 1975 business as stable if it 
remains in the top ten list in 1996 or grew at least as fast as its country’s GDP from 1975 to 





















                    (1) 







 and  both in lists ten top the in is i if
i 0
1996 1975 1
d         (2) 







period the in GDP as fast as least at grew i if
i 0
1
h           (3) 
We construct one such index for each variant of each country’s list of top ten businesses.  We 
also construct a set of analogous equally weighted stability indexes denoted 
GDP
E W ; defined 











E h d                     (4) 
To construct these indexes, we must assess the 1996 fate of each 1975 top ten business.  
This requires assembling a detailed history of each business.    
Some businesses change names.  For example, some Malaysian company names contain 
the abbreviation BHD in one Dun and Bradstreet volume, but Berhad (corporation in Malay) in 
the other.  Likewise, Finland’s Nokia is listed as OY NOKIA AB in one edition and NOKIA OYJ 
in  the  other.    The  choice  of  language  sometimes  causes  confusion  too.    For  example,  the 
Japanese company listed in the 1975 data as Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK is listed under its 
English name, Sumitomo Metal Industries Limited, in 1996.  These changes are easily traced.  
  Other  name  changes  are  less  obvious,  but  are  revealed  in  the  detailed  histories  we 
construct for each business.  We compile these from company websites, business history books, 
and biographies of the principals of our 1975 top ten businesses.  Where this leaves ambiguities, 
we  scan  through  newspaper  records,  and,  in  many  cases,  phone  archivists  at  particular 
companies.  These efforts, plus telephone inquiries to bankers, brokers, and finance professors in 
different countries, clarify the fates of all our 1975 top ten businesses.    
  The fates of a few businesses are intrinsically ambiguous. For example, some spin off 
divisions.  Although the core business may be smaller in 1996, the aggregation of all successor 
businesses might be large.  In general, we follow the principal successor business only.  In some 
cases,  this  is  problematic.    For  example,  the  Argentine  state  controlled  enterprise  Servicios   10 
Electricos del Gran Buenos Aires SA (Segba) is one of that country’s top ten businesses for 
1975.  In the early 1990s, it split into Edenor and Edusur – with roughly equal numbers of 
employees going into each.  In this case, we take the combined employees of the two successors 
in assigning continued importance to the predecessor business.   
Table I reports the employee-weighted and equal-weighted stability indexes based on 
lists I and V for each of our 44 countries.  Interpreting these indexes is straightforward.  For 
example, the stability index of the United States based on list I, the minimally inclusive list 
which excludes financial, government controlled, and foreign controlled enterprises, is 
GDP
L75 W  = 
0.531.  This means that 53.1% of the employees of the top 10 businesses of 1975 worked for 
businesses that either remain in the top 10 list for 1996 or created jobs at least as fast as the 
growth rate of US GDP from 1975 through 1996.  Similarly, Japan’s equal-weighted stability 
index is 
GDP
E W  = 0.7, indicating that seven of Japan’s top ten employers in 1975 either remain 
among it’s top ten in 1996 or created jobs at least as fast as Japanese GDP grew.  In general, the 
top businesses in higher income countries are more stable than those in developing economies.   
  Our  employee-weighted  and  equal-weighted  indexes  are  highly  positively  correlated, 
with r  = 0.851 (￿ < 0.01) for the maximally inclusive indexes and r  = 0.824 (￿ < 0.01) for the 
minimally inclusive indexes.  The indexes based on minimally versus maximally inclusive lists 
are  also  highly  significantly  correlated  with  each  other  (￿  <  0.01  in  all  cases),  with  point 
estimates in the 0.52 to 0.66 range.  Indexes based on different lists are more highly correlated 
among higher income countries.   
  The upper panel of Table 2 presents univariate statistics for our stability indexes.   
 
[Table 2 about here]   11 
2.3  Measuring Economic Growth  
Ideally, we would measure economic growth subsequent to, and therefore potentially ‘caused by’ 
top business stability.  However, Schumpeter (1912, 1942) and others stress that the economic 
effects we study operate only over the very long term – time clocked in generations rather than 
years.  More frequent data would therefore not be helpful. Genuinely augmenting our data with 
more time periods would require going further back in time to the mid and early 20
th century.  
This is not possible given available data, so we are limited to a single cross section of data, in 
which we use our big business stability indexes, measured over 1975 to 1996, to explain long run 
growth at that window’s endpoint.    
  Long run growth cannot be measured easily at a point in time, for annual growth rates are 
distorted by business cycles and even transient crises.  We therefore gauge long term growth 
using observed growth over a window attached to 1996.  Requiring that the window begin at 
1996 would let us use  past stability to predict  future  growth –  an econometrically desirable 
temporal arrangement of variables.  However, a short window beginning in 1996 generates noisy 
variables because its endpoints are contaminated by economic crises in East Asia and parts of 
Latin America.  A longer window beginning in 1996 is not possible yet, for many countries 
publish national income accounts data with a lag of several  years and these are rendered in 
comparable form in the Penn World Tables only after further delay.  Moreover, a longer window 
beginning in 1996 would also induce noise, for big business stability changes in its early years 
might affect economic growth in its later years.   
  We therefore define long-term economic growth as per capita GDP growth  
  ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 1990 2000 GDP capita per GDP capita per y - = D         (5)   12 
from 1990 to 2000 – a ten year window roughly centered on the endpoint of the window over 
which we gauge big business sector stability.  Data are from the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1, 
which include comparable national income accounts figures through 2000.
4  GDP figures are in 
US  dollars  at  purchasing  power  parity,  and  inflation-adjusted  to  1996  dollars  to  remove 
differences  in  inflation  rates  and  living  costs  across  countries.    Since  y y y / ) ln( D @ D ,  we 
interpret  ) ln(y D  as a fractional growth rate in per capita GDP.   
  The  Penn  World  Tables  let  us  decompose  overall  growth  into  growth  due  to  capital 
accumulation and growth due to increased total factor productivity (TFP).  To do this, we first 
measure each country’s rate of per capita physical capital growth, Dln(k), from 1990 to 2000.  
To estimate ln(k)  at each endpoint, we assume  an initial capital stock of zero for 1950 and 
construct a time series Ki,t of total stock of physical capital in country i in year t recursively as 
  Ki, t+1 = Ki, t + Ii, t – dKi, t                    (6)  
where Ii,t is aggregate real investment for country i in year t, from Penn World Table 6.1, and d is 
a depreciation rate of 7% under the perpetual inventory method.  Scaling the total real physical 
capital  stock  by  population  yields  per  capita  real  physical  capital  stock.    This  procedure  is 
similar to that in King and Levine (1994).   
  We then follow the methodology of Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999) to estimate each 
country’s TFP growth as the growth in its per capita GDP minus 0.3 times the growth of its per 
capita physical capital.
5 
                                                 
4 The Penn World Tables are available from the National Bureau of Economic Research at www.nber.org.    
5 Caselli (2003) shows this decomposition of economy growth changes nontrivially if the capital share exceeds 1/3.  
As robustness checks, we experimented with a range of capital share assumptions.  Estimates based on Caselli’s 
methodology and constant assumptions up to 0.4 generate results similar to those shown.  We follow the popular 
approach of setting the capital share to 0.3 in the tables.     13 
  The second panel of Table 2 presents summary statistics.  The mean of 0.223 for  ) ln(y D  
indicates that the typical country’s per capita GDP rose by about 22.3% from 1990 to 2000 in 
real US dollars at purchasing power parity.  Likewise, the average growth in real per capita 
physical capital stock is 26.3% and the average total factor productivity growth is 14.4%.  The 
ranges  of  these  three  measures  are  wide:  from  -8.3%  (Venezuela)  to  62.4%  (Israel)  in  total 
growth, from -4.2% (Venezuela) to 46.7% (Israel) in total factor productivity growth, and from -
21.7% (South Africa) to 67.4% (Korea) in real per capita physical capital accumulation.
6    
 
3.  Findings 
Our central finding is that a more stable list of large businesses is associated with slower growth.  
We first show this with simple correlations and then turn to regressions analogous to the basic 
models surveyed in Mankiw (1995), but adding stability as an additional independent variable.  
The section concludes with a robustness discussion. 
 
3.1.  Simple Correlations 
Table 2 Panel B presents simple correlations between our growth measures and stability indices.  
All  our  maximally  inclusive  stability  indexes  are  significantly  negatively  correlated  with  all 
three growth measures – with significance levels somewhat lower for equally weighted than 
employee-weighted stability indexes. The minimally inclusive indexes – which drop financial, 
foreign-controlled, and state-controlled businesses – tell a slightly different story.  Total per 
capita GDP growth and TFP growth are negatively correlated with these stability indexes, but 
                                                 
6 Another approach would look analogously at the turnover in each country’s list of leading industries.  We are 
pursuing this elsewhere.  While this might seem a simpler line of attack, data problems actually make it considerably 
more complicated.     14 
capital  accumulation  is  not  significantly  correlated  with  our  minimally  inclusive  stability 
indexes– though the correlation point estimates remains negative.   
 
3.2  Regressions of Long-Term Economic Growth on Big Business Stability 
Economic growth rates are known to be higher for countries with lower initial levels of income, 
more educated workforces, and more extensive capital assets.
7  Table 2 Panel B shows that our 
big business stability indexes correlate with these initial condition determinants of economic 
growth.  Thus, the simple correlations described above might only reflect known determinants of 
economic growth.   
  We therefore follow Mankiw (1995) and regress our growth measures on a big business 
stability index controlling for initial income, initial stock of physical capital, and initial stock of 
human capital. Thus, we run regressions of the form 






































































4 3 2 1 0   (7) 
where  the  economic  growth  rate  is  either  per  capita  GDP  growth,  TFP  growth,  or  capital 
accumulation and big business stability index is one of the stability indexes, all as defined above.   
  The control variables in (7) are as follows.   
Initial income level is the logarithm of 1990 real PPP US dollar per capita GDP, ln(y), as 
in the Penn World Tables.  Initial physical capital stock is the logarithm of real per capita 
physical capital in 1990, ln(k), from (6) in Section 2.  As a proxy for the initial human capital 
stock per capita, we take the logarithm of the average years of education for people aged 25 or 
over, ln(h), from Barro and Lee (2000).     15 
  Thus, the regressions we run take the forms 
  e b b b b b + W + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( h k y growth           (8) 
where W is 
GDP
L75 W  or 
GDP
E W  .  Table 3 presents regression coefficients.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Panel  A  reports  full  details  for  regressions  using  minimally  inclusive  equal-weighted 
stability  indexes.    The  indexes  all  attract  significant  negative  coefficients  in  regressions 
explaining  per  capita  GDP  and  TFP  growth.    That  is,  more  stable  dominant  businesses  are 
associated with slower economic growth and slower productivity growth.  Our stability indexes 
can be interpreted as inverse measures of the marginalization of previously dominant businesses.  
This interpretation of our result implies that a greater marginalization of past leading businesses 
is significantly associated with faster growth, faster productivity growth, and even faster capital 
accumulation. 
  Panel B reports regression results using stability indexes based on each variant of our top 
ten lists described above.  For brevity, the table reports only the regression coefficients on those 
indexes.  In every case, big business stability is negatively and significantly related with both per 
capita  GDP  growth  and  TFP  growth.    While  the  stability  measures  also  attract  negative 
coefficients in every regressions explaining capital accumulation, these are significant only in 
four of the ten stability variants; and three of these are for indexes constructed from top 10 lists 
including sometime SCEs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See Barro (1991), Mankiw (1995), and others.  Barro uses initial capital investment, rather than assets.  Our results 
are robust to using either.     16 
  These relationships are economically as well as statistically significant.  To save space, 
and to be conservative, we discuss only the results for indexes based on the minimally inclusive 
top ten lists, which also have the least significant results.  A one standard deviation increase in 
the labor-weighted stability index is associated with a per capita GDP growth drop of 0.22 x 
0.227 or 5%.  This is approximately 36.5% of the cross-country standard deviation in real per 
capita GDP growth.  Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the equal-weighted stability 
index is associated with a per capita GDP growth depressed by 47.5% of the standard deviation 
of  that  variable.    A  one  standard  deviation  increases  in  these  same  labor  or  equal-weighted 
indexes  is  likewise  associated  with  total  factor  productivity  growth  reductions  of  32.9%  or 
44.8%, respectively, of the standard deviation of that variable.  Also, a one standard deviation 
increase in these indexes is associated with per capita capital accumulation lower by 27.4% and 
32%, respectively, of its standard deviation.   
  In summary, big business sector stability accounts for a substantial part of the variation in 
economic  growth  across  countries.    The  regressions  tie  more  marginalization  of  old  top  ten 
businesses to faster growth.   
 
3.4  Rich or Poor? 
Interestingly, including S.C.E.s in the list of dominant businesses relates the stability indexes 
(Lists II and III) to slower capital accumulation (Panel B of Table 3).  S.C.E.s are more pervasive 
in the top ten lists of lower income economies, whose capital markets are typically ill developed.  
S.C.E.s might affect growth either by helping bridge this gap or by widening it as they crowd out 
private investment or otherwise impede financial development.  More generally, Gerschenkron 
(1962) and others argue that economic growth in rich countries differs qualitatively from that in   17 
poor countries “catching up.”  Therefore, we examine the relationship between growth and big 
business sector stability in subsamples of initially rich and poor countries.
8   
[Table 4 about here] 
  Table 4 reproduces the regressions of Table 3 for rich and poor country subsamples.  We 
define countries as rich if their per capita GDP in 1990 is above the median for the 44 countries 
in our sample.   
  Among richer countries, slower per capita GDP and total factor productivity growth are 
associated with significantly higher minimally inclusive stability indexes, which include only 
non-financial  private  sector  domestically  controlled  businesses.    Capital  accumulation  is 
statistically unrelated to any indexes in rich countries.  Including foreign controlled enterprises 
generates quite similar results, with slightly less statistical significance; and including S.C.E.s 
renders all the indexes entirely insignificant – though negative signs emerge in almost every 
case.  Thus,  for  developed  countries,  the  marginalization  of  top  non-financial  domestically 
controlled private sector businesses is most significantly associated with faster growth.   
  Among poorer countries, significant results obtain only if S.C.E.s are included in tallying 
the  stability  of  large  businesses.    For  these  countries,  labor-weighted  stability  indexes  are 
associated with slower real per capita GDP growth, total factor productivity growth, and capital 
accumulation.  These results link the stability of large S.C.E.s in poorer countries to the results in 
Table  3B  based  on  versions  I,  II,  and  III  of  the  top  ten  lists.    They  also  suggest  that,  in 
developing  countries,  the  turnover  of  dominant  private  sector  businesses  is  not  significantly 
related to growth, though again, all point estimates are negative.  
                                                 
8 Aghion et al.  (2004) develop a comprehensive formal model based on Gerschenkron’s insight.  Our results in this 
section broadly support their model’s validity.     18 
3.5  Robustness Tests 
These basic results in Tables 3 and 4 survive a battery of robustness checks.  Sensible changes in 
regression specifications and variable definitions generate qualitatively similar results.  By this 
we mean that these changes do not alter the sign, approximate magnitude, or significance of the 
coefficient on the big business stability indexes.   
  Residual diagnostics analyses show that our  results are not affected by  outliers.  For 
example, Cook's D and DFFITS tests indicate no outliers.  Student residuals point only to Ireland 
as a potential outlier.  However, dropping that country from our sample produces qualitatively 
identical results.  Generalized White tests reject heteroskedasticity.   
  We wish to insure that differences in country size do not affect our results.  The top ten 
businesses in a small economy might be smaller in absolute size than those in a large economy; 
and yet might constitute a larger part of the overall corporate sector.  We control for this by 
including country size as a control.   To gauge country size, we use the logarithm total 1990 
GDP, adjusted to 1996 dollars at purchasing power parity exchange rates, which we denote ln(Y), 
from Penn World Table 6.1, and run 
    e b b b b b b + W + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( Y h k y growth       (9) 
The  country  size  variable  is  uniformly  statistically  insignificant,  and  its  inclusion  does  not 
qualitatively change our results.  Similarly, using the log of total population, or area in square 
kilometers, to control for country size does not change our results.
9  
  The  top  ten  businesses  in  some  countries,  such  as  Sweden  and  South  Africa,  are 
essentially  the  population  of  large  businesses.    In  others,  like  the  United  States  and  United 
                                                 
9 One alternative approach is to make the length of our lists of large businesses proportional to the size of the 
economy by including more firms in larger economies. However, this is operationally difficult because gleaning 
accurate corporate histories in remote countries is often quite involved.  Moreover, the choice of the proportionality 
factor also introduces a new degree of arbitrariness.  We leave this to possible future research.     19 
Kingdom, the top ten are merely the largest from a broad range of big businesses.  Countries 
with only a few truly huge businesses might be qualitatively different from those with many 
roughly equally large businesses.  To control for this, we include the labor force of the top ten 
businesses as a fraction of national population (or GDP) in 1975 as an additional control.  This 
also generates qualitatively similar results to those shown.    
  Our results might also depend on the industrial structures of economies.  Specifically, 
dependence on natural resources might affect big business sector stability and economic growth.  
Resource abundant countries may have large natural resources businesses that remain large to 
exploit  economies  of  scale.    Yet,  for  a  variety  of  political  and  institutional  reasons,  these 
countries might also remain poor (Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999 and Sachs and Warner, 2001).  
However, including the resource dependence measure of Hall and Jones (1999) as an additional 
control  variable  preserves  the  rough  magnitudes  and  significance  levels  of  the  stability 
measures.
10   
  Other versions of the stability indexes behave similarly to those shown in the tables.  
Defining stability as a 1975 top ten business remaining in the 1996 top ten list; retaining 50%, or 
25%, or 10% of its 1975 employment in 1996; or a disjunction of the former with any of the later 
criteria all generate qualitatively similar results to those described above. The reported indexes 
capture one measure of the extent to which 1975 top businesses remain important; the alternative 
                                                 
10 The mining variable in Hall and Jones (1999) is for 1988 “when possible or the closest available year.”  We 
follow their procedure to construct an analogous variable using 1975 and 1996 data from the World Development 
Indicators database. We construct two sets of control for natural resource dependence using fuel, oil, and metals 
exports over merchandise exports (FOM). The first set includes two variables – the level of FOM in 1975 and its 
change from 1975 to 1996. The second set is the average of FOM in 1975 and 1996. Including either set of resource 
dependence controls in our regressions preserves the magnitudes and significance levels of the stability variables in 
per capita GDP and TFP growth regressions.   20 
indexes  capture  the  extent  to  which  they  remain  dominant,  or  merely  escape  from  being 
marginalized.
11   
  One  alternative  stability  index  we  constructed  does  generate  qualitatively  different 
results.  We developed a continuity of control index, which looks at the family name of each 
company’s top executive in 1975 and 1996.  Our idea was to capture the fraction of the big 
business sector that remained under the control of the same individuals or families over the two 
decades.  Labor-weighted and equal weighted indexes of continuity of control are uncorrelated 
with GDP growth, productivity growth, and capital accumulation.  One interpretation is that 
creative  destruction  requires  more  than  a  turnover  of  top  management.    A  turnover  of  big 
businesses,  and  perhaps  in  their  intangible  corporate  routines  as  well  as  physical  assets,  is 
needed.  Another is that our continuity of control index is too noisy to be of use because different 
last names may correspond to continuity if CEOs are replaced by nephews, acolytes, and the 
like; and that the same last name may correspond to discontinuity if a son’s policies differ greatly 
from his father’s.  Further research is needed to clarify these issues.     
  In  a  further  set  of  robustness  tests,  we  substitute  two  alternative  productivity  growth 
measures for those used in the tables.  Proposed by Mankiw (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999), 
respectively, these include human capital as a factor of production.  These alternatives do not 
change the significance of the stability indexes.  
Next, replacing real GDP per capita growth with per capita GNI (gross national income) 
also produces patterns of signs, coefficient size, and statistical significance very similar to those 
shown in the Tables. GNI can be measured in two ways. The first uses the Atlas Method and 
                                                 
11 Since results based on these other versions of the continued importance indexes are similar to those in the tables, 
we do not report them to conserve space.  These results are available from the authors upon request.     21 
converts national currency to current US dollars, and the second converts national dollars to 
“international dollars” at purchasing power parity. Both measures produce similar results. 
Finally,  if  we  measure  initial  stock  of  human  capital  by  the  logarithm  of  the  average 
number of years of total education in the male population over 25 in 1990, rather than the general 
adult population (on the grounds that males are more likely to be in the work force in many 
countries), we again obtain qualitatively similar results.    
   
4.   Institutional Underpinnings  
The previous section shows that greater private sector bug business stability is associated with 
slower economic growth, slower total factor productivity growth, and, albeit less significantly, 
less  capital  accumulation.    This  is  consistent  with  creative  destruction  underlying  economic 
growth.  It also begs the question of why big businesses are more stable in some countries than 
others.    Although  many  factors  doubtless  matter,  we  focus  on  differences  in  economic 
institutions,  for  these  have  also  been  related  to  long  term  growth.    Our  finding  that,  for 
developing countries, our result is evident only if S.C.E.s are included in tallying big business 
stability  raises  the  possibility  that  the  State  may  play  a  role  in  these  differences.  Other 
institutional arguments we consider turn on financial development and economic openness.   
  To explore these institutional arguments, we test for relationships between proxies for 
institutional effects and our stability indexes, ￿.  These tests are regressions of the form  
  u c h c k c y c c + F + + + + = W 4 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(             (10) 
where the initial income, physical capital, and human capital controls are as in (8) but for 1975.  
These regressions use equal and labor weighted stability indexes constructed using all five sets of 
top ten lists.  The institutional development variable, ￿, is a measure of the economic role of the   22 
government, the development of the financial system, or the country’s openness to the global 
economy.  We now turn to the specific institutional variables in turn.   
 
4.1  Government 
The size of the government sector might plausibly underlie the observed relationship between 
big  business  stability  in  a  range  of  related  ways.    These  depend  on  the  benevolence  or 
malevolence of the political elite.   
  A highly benevolent government might seek employment stability and/or an egalitarian 
income  distribution.    If  the  government  views  the  country’s  large  businesses  as  important 
providers of steady middle-income jobs that promote these ends, it might intervene to stabilize 
its big business sector.
12  A benign government might view general economic stability as a public 
good per se.
13   Big businesses can also be handy channels through which politicians can affect 
social and political policies, as in Högfeldt (2004), and politicians – benevolent or self interested 
– might protect such businesses to preserve their power.
14  For these or other reasons, benevolent 
politicians might act to preserve established large businesses even if this retards growth.     
                                                 
12 For example, when the German government bailed out Philipp Holzmann, Finance Minister Hans Eichel declared 
that “the government has a responsibility to step in if a major German company is about to collapse and cost 
thousands of people their jobs.” (See Edmund Andrews ‘Navigating the Economy of a Changing Germany’, New 
York Times, December 7, 1999.)  The same motive seems to underlie Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s pressure on 
German banks to save the jobs of the 22,000 employees of the bankrupt engineering firm Babcock Borsig AG with a 
$700 to $800 million bailout. (See ‘Schroeder Seeks bailout Aid for Bankrupt Firm’ International Herald Tribune, 
July 6, 2002, p 11.) 
13 Such beliefs seem to have led the Japanese government to propose a ¥200 billion ($1.90 billion) bailout of Sogo 
Department Stores, which Asiaweek described as part of Japan’s long tradition of corporate bailouts designed to 
minimize “confusion”.  See Jonathan Sprague and Murakami Mutsuko ‘Tokyo's Sogo Shocker - A bailout and a 
reversal show no policy at all’ Asiaweek, 26(29), July 28, 2000.  Note, however, that Asiaweek continues that, to the 
bewilderment of senior politicians, the bailout was derailed when “[t]he public exploded over the use of their tax 
money to rescue a poorly managed private company.”   
14 For example, Business Week reports Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir unapologetic about his government’s 
policy of selecting a handful of wealthy businessmen for privileges and assigning them the role of creating jobs, 
implementing  big  projects,  and  keeping  the  economy  growing.   The  article  quotes  Mustapha  Mohamed  of  the 
Finance  Ministry  saying  ''We  view  Malaysia  as  a  corporation,  and  the  shareholders  in  the  government  are 
companies.” and “To the extent you help the bigger guys, the smaller guys benefit.''  See Sheri Prasso, Mark Clifford   23 
  Regardless of which reason is paramount, state intervention to stabilize big business can 
hinder growth in a variety of ways.  Government crowds out private investment, as in neo-
Keynesian macroeconomics.  Government intervention adds political risk to normal business 
risks, deterring investment.  Red tape, delays, and other political fixed costs block entry by new 
competitors, as in Djankov et al. (2002), Krueger (1974), and Olson (1963, 1982).  All three link 
slow growth to high stability.     
  Alternatively, a country’s government might be controlled to some extent by its great 
businesses, and manipulated to their benefit – see Hayek (1960).  Stigler (1971) argues that large 
businesses capture the bureaucrats who regulate them, and Beason and Weinstein (1996), among 
others, present evidence of this.  Tullock (1967) argues more generally that returns to political 
rent-seeking rise with the extent of state interventionism.
15  Krueger (1993), Murphy et al. (1991, 
1993), and others argue that, if governments make rent-seeking more lucrative, businesses divert 
resources  to  rent  seeking  and  away  from  real  investment,  slowing  growth.
16      This  line  of 
reasoning is consistent with our earlier finding that the stability indexes that include S.C.E.s best 
explain slow growth in low income countries.
17       
  We gauge the sheer importance of government in the economies of each country with 
1975 public sector consumption over GDP, as reported in World Development Indicators.  As a 
more nuanced measures of the role of the government in the economy, we also use the 1975 
GINI coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996) and the World Income Inequality database 
to measure income inequality, which benevolent government intervention arguable reduces.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Joyce Barnathan ‘Malaysia: The Feud - How Mahathir and Anwar became embroiled in a clash that threatens to 
send Malaysia into upheaval’ Business Week, October 28, 1998. 
15 Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that large, established, family controlled corporate groups are especially able rent-
seekers. 
16 Though Haber et al.  (2003) argue that government capture by the business elite may be an optimal second best 
outcome absent the rule of law.     24 
also use a legal origin indicator variable, set to one for Common Law legal systems and to zero 
otherwise; and a measure of red tape barriers to entry.  The legal origin indicator is from La 
Porta et al. (1997b), who link Common Law legal origins to better government institutions, 
especially to  an independent judiciary  and reduced official  corruption.   The red tape barrier 
measure is the logarithm of the “time required to obtain legal status for new business” in days, 
from Djankov (2002, Table 3).  Unfortunately, the last variable is measured as of 1999, and so 
might be a result of faster growth or big business instability, rather than a cause.  We examine it 
because entry barriers are clearly relevant to our stability measures, but concede that interpreting 
its coefficients is problematic.     
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
  Panel A of Table 5 shows that higher government consumption is significantly correlated 
with greater labor-weighted stability indexes; but only if they are based on lists IV and V, which 
exclude  financial  companies  and  sometime  SCEs.    This  is  consistent  with  big  government 
favoring the continued economic importance of established big businesses.  Greater stability is 
usually negatively, but insignificantly, related to income equality – undermining the idea that big 
business stability might promote egalitarian goals.  Civil Code legal systems and longer delays in 
establishing new businesses legally are also associated with more big business stability, but only 
using indexes based on Lists I, II, or III, which include S.C.E.s.      
  Other tests we perform searching for links between stability and laudable social outcomes 
are uniformly insignificant.  GINI coefficients in 1996 are uncorrelated with stability, as are 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Fisman and Svennson (2000), Fisman (2001), Fisman and Di Tella (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and others 
document the first-order importance of political rent-seeking in low-income economies.     25 
changes  in  GINI  coefficients  from  1975  to  1996.    Other  equality  or  social  policy  outcome 
measures – unemployment, the variance of the unemployment rate, and indicator variables for 
various sorts of crises – are also unrelated to our stability indexes. The only exception is hardly 
breathtaking: ‘government crises’ are less frequent in rich countries with contemporaneously 
more  stable  large  corporate  sectors.  If  governments  stabilize  their  large  corporate  sectors  to 
promote such social goals, these interventions seem of limited success.       
  Big business stability is thus associated with Civil Law Legal systems and with worse red 
tape if we include S.C.E.s in our top ten lists.  Otherwise, only the sheer size of government is 
related to larger stability indexes. 
  
4.2    Finance  
Schumpeter (1912) argues that a well-functioning financial system is a prerequisite for rapid 
economic  growth  because  it  allows  innovative  entrepreneurs  to  obtain  financing.    Outside 
investors’ current legal rights vis à vis corporate insiders are indeed highly positively correlated 
with a country’s financial development.
18 King and Levine (1993) find that countries with better 
developed  financial  systems  do  grow  faster.
19    Schumpeter  (1912)  also  holds  that  creative 
entrepreneurs’ rapidly growing new businesses overwhelm old established businesses – a process 
he dubs creative destruction.  Thus, better functioning financial systems and stronger investor 
legal  rights  might  be  associated  with  faster  creative  destruction,  and  hence  with  both  faster 
                                                 
18  See  La  Porta  et  al.    (1997a,  1997b,  1998,  1999b,  2000),  Levine  et  al.    (2003),  and  others.  Rosenthal  and 
Lamoreaux (2004a, 2004b), Aganin and Volpin (2004) and others argue that this cross-country relationship is a 
recent phenomenon.   For overviews, see Glaeser and Goldin (2004) and Morck and Steier (2004).   
19 See also Bekaert and Harvey (1998), Khanna and Palepu (2000), La Porta et al. (2000), Levine (2002), Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Morck et al. (2000), Olsen (2000) and others.     26 
growth and a less stable big business sector.
20   
  Digging deeper, Rajan and Zingales (2003) ask why, given this, so many countries have 
ill-protected investors and ill-developed financial markets.  Perhaps historical and cultural factors 
intervene.
21  Or, the insiders of established big businesses might wield their political influence to 
weaken their countries’ financial sectors.
22  This erects a barrier to entry against upstart rivals 
and blocks creative destruction, stabilizing the big business sector but retarding growth.     
  We gauge financial development by the sheer size of the financial system and by the 
strength of investor protection.  Financial system size is measured by 1975 credit to the private 
sector and by 1978 stock market capitalization, both as fractions of GDP, from Beck et al. (1999) 
and the World Development Indicators database. We gauge investor protection with the creditor 
and shareholder rights tallies assembled by La Porta et al. (1998).
23  
  Panel B of Table 5 show that a large banking system (private sector credit is large relative 
to GDP) is associated with greater equally weighted stability indexes, except those based only on 
non-financial private sector businesses.  In contrast, stock market size is unrelated to stability.  
Yet  creditor  rights  appear  unimportant,  while  shareholder  rights  are  associated  with  reduced 
                                                 
20 A related issue, raised by Rajan (1992) and others, is whether bank or stock market development matters more.  
Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) present evidence suggesting this is a second order issue.  But see also 
e.g. Maurer and Haber (2004). 
21 La Porta et al. (1997a, 1997b, 1998), Stulz and Williams (2003), and others.   
22 See Morck, Stangeland, Yeung (2000), Pagano and Volpin (2001), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Perotti and Volpin 
(2004), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005), and others. 
24 La Porta et al. (1998) index creditor rights from zero to four, assigning one point each when: (1) the country 
imposes  restrictions,  such  as  creditors’  consent  or  minimum  dividends  to  file  for  reorganization;  (2)  secured 
creditors  are  able  to  gain  possession  of  their  security  once  the  reorganization  petition  has  been  approved  (no 
automatic stay); (3) secured creditors have first priority on distribution of proceeds from asset sales of a bankrupted 
firm; and (4) management does not have to stay pending the resolution of a reorganization.  Their shareholder right 
index ranges from zero to six, assigning one point each when: (1) proxy vote by mail is allowed; (2) shareholders are 
not  required  to  deposit  their  shares  prior  to  the  General  Shareholders’  Meeting;  (3)  cumulative  voting  or 
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism 
exists (meaning that minorities shareholders have legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by directors); (5) 
the  minimum  percentage  of  share  capital  that  entitles  a  shareholder  to  call  for  an  Extraordinary  Shareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, and (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a 
shareholders’ vote.    27 
stability indexes based on any lists that include S.C.E.s.     
  That  a  large  banking  system  is  associated  with  a  more  stable  big  business  sector  is 
consistent with other work.  For example, Morck and Nakamura (1999) and Morck et al. (2000) 
argue that Japanese banks use their corporate governance influence to induce stability in that 
country’s large businesses, rather than growth and dynamism, because their primary concern is 
the timely repayment of loans, not firm value maximization.  Likewise, Perotti and von Thadden 
(2003) argue that democracies whose median voter values stability more, as a way of protecting 
her human capital, are biased towards bank as opposed to stock market development, precisely 
because banks act in this way.  
  Our shareholder rights measures are for the 1990s, rather than for 1975, and thus might 
measure effects, rather than causes of big business stability.  For example, countries with large 
state  controlled  sectors  in  1975  might  have  enacted  shareholder  rights  so  that  privatizations 
would  fetch  more  for  their  treasuries.    However,  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997a,  1997b)  argue  that 
shareholder rights are intrinsically stronger under Common Law legal systems, which were all in 
place long before 1975.  The finding in Panel A that Common Law systems are associated with 
reduced stability when S.C.E.s are included in compiling those indexes suggests that S.C.E.s are 
less durable in Common Law countries.  One possibility is that governments in these countries 
are more prone to privatize S.C.E.s when their social purposes cease, and these businesses are 
then  taken  over,  merged,  or  fail.    In  Civil  Code  countries,  with  weaker  shareholder  rights, 
governments may find privatization less remunerative, and so hold on to their S.C.E.s.   
 
4.3   Openness  
Trade openness encourages businesses to specialize according to their countries’ comparative 
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advantages, while capital account openness lets domestic businesses access capital from abroad.  
Standard  trade  and  investment  theories  imply  that  either  form  of  openness  should  enhance 
growth.  For  example,  Bekaert,  Harvey  and  Lundblad  (2005)  show  that  capital  account 
liberalization increases subsequent real economic growth by about 1% per year on average. From 
1975 through 1996, most economies grew more open, and this appears to have induced more 
rapid growth.
24  Lower stability indexes might thus reflect increasing openness forcing corporate 
sector adjustments to changing comparative advantage, capital costs, and competitive pressures.   
  Politicians might wield protectionism as a tool to protect established big businesses from 
more efficient foreign competitors.
25  Or, protectionism might be adopted for purely ideological 
reasons, and the ensuing big business stability might be an unintended consequence.  Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) argue that the principals of large established businesses were less successful at 
restricting entry by hobbling financial systems in more open countries.  This might be because 
politicians’ ability to serve special interests is more restricted in more open economies.
26   If 
openness correlates with reduced rent seeking and easier entry by new businesses, it should also 
correlate with higher growth and lower stability indexes.   
  We  capture  trade  openness  with  exports  plus  imports  over  GDP  and  capital  account 
openness with foreign direct investment inflow over GDP.  Panel C of Table 5 shows less trade 
and  capital  account  openness  corresponding  to  greater  stability  of  leading  private  sector 
businesses (lists IV and V).
27    
                                                 
24 See Sachs and Warner (1995), Henry (2000a, 2000b, 2003), Bekaert et al. (2005, 2006), and others.  But see also 
Edison et al. (2002).   
25 See Krueger (1993), Morck et al. (2000), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and others. 
26 Ibid.   
27 Nevertheless, the result on trade openness is weak.  Our trade openness variable is for 1975.  The impact of 
openness on stability could stem from both the level of openness and the increase in openness.  The former is 
positively related to 1975 trade openness while the latter could behave in the opposite manner.  Hence, the two 
forces could offset each other.  We included change in trade openness from 1975 to 1996 as a right hand side   29 
4.4   Rich and Poor Countries 
The pattern in Panel A of Table 5 is almost entirely due to high income countries.  In addition, 
red tape costs and delays are associated with greater stability in high income countries even 
using indexes based on lists IV and V (no financial companies or S.C.E.s).  Restricting the 
regressions  in  Panel  A  to  low  income  countries  yields  few  significant  coefficients,  but 
consistently  negative  signs  on  government  size  –  big  governments  are  (insignificantly) 
associated with less stable big business sectors.  Red tape is associated (again insignificantly) 
with more instability if the indexes include only private sector businesses.  If the top ten lists 
include a broader range of enterprises, no clear pattern of signs remains.  Greater 1975 inequality 
is significantly associated with lower subsequent big business stability, but only if the index 
includes S.C.E.s. 
  The positive relationship between the banking system’s size and stability is also due to 
high  income  countries,  and  is  absent  for  low  income  countries.    The  link  between  greater 
shareholder rights and big business turnover (for lists including S.C.E.s) is significant in high 
and low income countries alike.  The analogous relationship with Common Law legal origin is 
significant only in high income countries.  One interpretation of this is that Common Law legal 
systems countries with extensive state-controlled sectors boosted shareholder rights so privatized 
S.C.E.s would fetch higher prices when sold to public shareholders.    
  In contrast, the greater  private sector big business instability in more open countries, 
revealed in Panel C, is due almost entirely to low income countries.  Trade and capital account 
openness are uncorrelated with our indexes in high income countries, but the patterns evident in 
                                                                                                                                                             
variable, overlooking endogeneity.  We still found little significance for both the change and the initial level of trade 
openness.   30 
panel C remain statistically significant across low income countries.  Protectionism appears more 
important to big business stability in low income countries.   
 
4.5   Further Robustness Checks 
Residual diagnostics tests show that our results are not driven by outliers, and heteroskedasticity 
problems are rejected in generalized White tests.   
  If we substitute other variables likely to capture the same effects as those used, we obtain 
similar results.  For example, using government spending instead of government consumption, or 
the “cost of obtaining legal status for a new business” as fraction of per capita GDP instead of 
the “number of days of delay” all yield results qualitatively similar to those shown in Panel A of 
Table 5shown .  Using “total domestic credit”, rather than “total credit to the private sector”, 
over GDP likewise yields similar results to those shown in Panel B.  Using the modified index of 
trade openness recommended by Frankel (2000) generates results similar to those in Panel C
28.    
 
5.    Big Business Stability Per Se? 
Any causal interpretation of the robust negative relationship between stability and growth in 
Section 3 must remain a hypothesis.  We can devise no convincing way to rule out endogeneity 
based on reverse causality or latent variables.  We must therefore consider implications of these 
alternative interpretations of our findings to assess their plausibility.   
  Reverse causality might induce the observed relationships if faster growth creates more 
and larger new businesses.  However, why rapid growth need do this, rather than increase the 
                                                 
28 Frankel (2000) points out that smaller countries are naturally more dependent on trade than larger ones, and so 
recommends “imports over GDP minus all foreign countries’ GDP over world GDP.”  Intuitively, in a world without 
border, imports over GDP should equal foreign production over world production.  If imports are higher than this, 
the economy is more open.      31 
size of old, dominant businesses, still requires an economic explanation.  Indeed, our robustness 
checks link economy growth to more stringent definitions of ‘continued importance’ – like the 
business  retaining  at  least  10%  of  its  1975  labor  force  in  1996.    Economy  growth  appears 
correlated with absolute declines in the importance of old dominant businesses, not just their 
eclipse by rising stars.  Rapid growth ‘causing’ the absolute decline of old dominant businesses 
thus seems a problematic reverse causality argument.  In our view, Occam’s razor decidedly 
favors creative destruction ‘causing’ growth and undermining old dominant businesses in the 
process.   
  Standard  statistical  procedures  for  assessing  the  direction  of  causality  are  difficult  to 
apply in this situation.  Granger causality tests require long time series.  Since, Schumpeter 
(1912, 1939, 1942) describes growth in the “very long run”, with time measured in generations, 
not years, assessing economic growth and big business stability over higher frequency intervals 
is not useful.  Adding a meaningful time dimension requires constructing stability indexes at 
appropriately long intervals into the deeper past.  This is difficult because compiling the indexes 
we have took the better part of two years.  Extending the data into the more remote past is 
beyond the scope of this study.    
  Latent  variables  are  harder  to  dispose  of  than  simple  reverse  causality.    Intrusive 
government,  sclerotic  financial  systems,  and  protectionism  are  all  thought  to  retard  growth.  
Perhaps these economy characteristics also stabilize established large businesses, inducing the 
patterns in our tables.  The most direct way to deal with the latent variable problem is to run 
multiple regressions of growth on stability plus key institutional environment variables from 
Table 5, viz.   
  V g g g g l g + F + W + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( h k y growth         (11)   32 
where   W is either 
GDP
L75 W  or 
GDP
E W  and ￿ is a vector of the representative institutional variables 
shown to be significant in Table 5 – government as a fraction of GDP, a Common Law dummy, 
red tape, banking system size, and trade openness.  Limited degrees of freedom preclude using 
the whole list of Table  5 variables, but the institutional variables are highly correlated so  a 
representative measure for each economic effect suffices.   
   
[Table 6 about here] 
 
  To conserve space, Table 6 reports only results for stability indexes based on maximally 
and minimally inclusive top ten lists. Even after including government size, a Common Law 
legal system indicator, the red tape measure, banking system development, and trade openness; 
stability retains its significant negative relationship with GDP growth and productive growth.  Its 
negative  relationship  with  capital  accumulation  remains  significant  only  in  regressions  using 
equally weighted stability based on List V. Stability indexes based on List II, III and IV (not 
shown)  yield  almost  identical  results  if  GDP  and  productivity  growth  are  the  dependent 
variables.  In regressions explaining capital accumulation, stability retains a significant negative 
coefficient only if it is defined using top-ten List II (value-weighted) or List III (both value and 
equal weighted).   
  These results are robust.  Student residual statistics again identify Ireland as an outlier in 
the  TFP  growth  regressions,  but  dropping  it  does  not  change  the  pattern  of  signs  and 
significance.  White general tests reject heteroskedasticity.    
  Repeating the regressions for the low and the high income sub-samples is problematic 
due  to  limited  degrees  of  freedom.    However,  including  institutional  variables  one-by-one   33 
provides  some  insight.    In  high  income  countries,  the  institutional  variables  eliminate  the 
statistical significance of big business stability in explaining the growth measures.  But in low 
income countries, the institutional variables leave big business stability significantly depressing 
per capita GDP growth, productivity growth and capital accumulation, as before, if sometime 
SCEs are included in the top ten lists.  The institutional variables are generally insignificant.
29   
  Table 6 thus reveals that stability per se has a negative relationship with growth, even in 
the  presence  of  institutional  control  variables.    This  independent  effect  is  more  pronounced 
across low income countries.  Indeed, across high income countries, institutional factors – small 
government, financial development, and openness – may well explain the link we detect between 
big  business  stability  and  slow  growth.    This  thus  indicates  that,  in  high  income  countries, 
institutional factors explain economic growth, in part at least, because they determine the pace of 
creative destruction an economy can sustain.    
  
6.   Conclusions 
Countries whose rosters of big businesses change less from 1975 through 1996 exhibit slower 
economic growth and total factor productivity growth in the 1990s.  This effect is most evident 
in higher income countries, where stable lists of leading businesses also correlate with reduced 
capital accumulation in the 1990s.  This effect is not due to new behemoths arising to push aside 
still thriving giants of 1975.  Rather, it largely reflects old giants waning as new ones wax large.   
  A list of big businesses that changes less from 1975 to 1996 is associated with a larger 
government sector in 1975, a non-Common law legal origin, and higher barriers to entry against 
new competitors.  A more stable big business sector is also associated with a larger banking 
                                                 
29 These results are available from the authors upon request.   34 
system and weaker legal protection for outside shareholders.  Openness to the global economy in 
1975 correlates with reduced big business stability.  Thus, the effect of big business stability on 
growth seems to work through these institutional factors, especially in high income countries.  In 
low income countries, institutional factors do not capture the effects of big business stability on 
growth.     
  These results support Schumpeter’s (1912) thesis that sustained long run growth requires 
a process of creative destruction, in which new corporate giants continually rise up to overthrow 
old leviathans, especially for developed countries.  For developing countries, continuous direct 
involvement of government in big business seems a prime suspect for slowing growth.  These 
results validate efforts to formalize and extend Schumpeter (1912), such as Aghion and Howit 
(1997).  While we cannot speak to other time periods or specific industry or country settings, 
growth due to innovation by large established businesses, as in Schumpeter (1942), appears less 
generally important in recent decades.    
  Our findings raise the concern that big business in some countries might be excessively 
stable, and that this might retard economic growth.  We recognize that further work is needed to 
clarify  the  direction  of  causation  in  the  economics  underlying  these  results.    We  welcome 
alternative interpretations of our findings and additional theoretical or empirical work that might 
cast light upon these issues.  
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Table 1 Panel A:  Stability Indexes Using Maximally and Minimally Inclusive Lists 
of Top Ten Businesses  
Maximally  inclusive  lists  include  all  available  enterprises.    Minimally  inclusive  lists  exclude 
financial, foreign controlled, and state controlled enterprises.  Stability indexes are fractions of 
top ten 1975 firms still in the 1996 top ten or having grown at least as fast as total GDP, weighted 
by 1975 employees, 
GDP
L75 W , or equally, 
GDP
E W .    
   Maximally Inclusive Top 10 List (I)  Minimally Inclusive Top 10 List (V) 
 
GDP
L75 W  
GDP
E W  
GDP
L75 W  
GDP
E W  
Argentina  0.31173  0.2  0.39277  0.3 
Australia  0.66851  0.6  0.73239  0.6 
Austria  0.83342  0.5  0.22772  0.2 
Belgium  0.40802  0.3  0.53091  0.5 
Bolivia  0.74855  0.3  0.27430  0.3 
Brazil  0.47057  0.5  0.29455  0.3 
Canada  0.40118  0.4  0.57342  0.4 
Chile  0.43968  0.4  0.27919  0.3 
Colombia  0.28799  0.2  0.60121  0.5 
Denmark  0.56300  0.4  0.72525  0.4 
Finland  0.78035  0.7  0.57816  0.5 
France  0.56400  0.4  0.55802  0.4 
Germany  0.76277  0.7  0.73497  0.7 
Greece  0.38197  0.3  0.07193  0.1 
Hong Kong  0.60582  0.3  0.60582  0.3 
India  0.12107  0.1  0.56486  0.4 
Indonesia  0.31485  0.3  0.39913  0.3 
Ireland  0.45014  0.3  0.39698  0.2 
Israel  0.59483  0.6  0.74440  0.4 
Italy  0.76126  0.4  0.78853  0.3 
Japan  0.72527  0.7  0.59077  0.6 
Korea  0.45119  0.5  0.34111  0.4 
Malaysia  0.07326  0.1  0.12253  0.1 
Mexico  0.76431  0.5  0.62523  0.5 
Netherlands  0.83944  0.6  0.84228  0.6 
New Zealand  0.20476  0.2  0.24253  0.3 
Norway  0.30084  0.3  0.12190  0.1 
Pakistan  0.22827  0.2  0.45168  0.4 
Peru  0.45936  0.5  0.26775  0.2 
Philippines  0.25999  0.2  0.07253  0.1 
Portugal  0.34266  0.2  0.08388  0.1 
Singapore  0.56019  0.4  0.06400  0.1 
South Africa  0.57996  0.5  0.66960  0.6 
Spain  0.46344  0.3  0.30168  0.3 
Sri Lanka  0.07093  0.1  0.24317  0.2 
Sweden  0.78482  0.5  0.78337  0.4 
Switzerland  0.83344  0.7  0.83344  0.7 
Taiwan  0.39190  0.2  0.62445  0.3 
Thailand  0.74212  0.6  0.60927  0.5 
Turkey  0.20833  0.1  0.38338  0.2 
United Kingdom  0.23128  0.2  0.53862  0.4 
United States  0.53122  0.5  0.53122  0.5 
Uruguay  0.49031  0.3  0.40564  0.2 
Venezuela  0.77755  0.5  0.40070  0.4 
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Table 2:  Main Variables 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics  
Variable     Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
 
Based on Maximally Inclusive List (I) of Top Ten Firms 
Continued importance index using total GDP 
growth as benchmark, labor weighted. 
GDP
L75 W   0.495  0.223  .0709  0.839 
Continued importance index using total GDP 
growth as benchmark, equally weighted. 
GDP
E W   0.381  0.179  0.100  0.727 
Based on Minimally Inclusive List (V) of Top Ten Firms 
Continued importance using total GDP growth 
as benchmark, labor weighted. 
GDP
L75 W   0.460  0.227  .0640  0.842 
Continued importance using total GDP growth 
as benchmark, equally weighted. 
GDP
E W   0.354  0.166  .0909  0.700 
Growth Measures 
         
Growth in per capita GDP in US dollars at PPP, 
1990 to 2000  Dln(y)  0.223  0.137  -.0827  0.624 
Total factor productivity growth, 1990 to 2000  DTFP  0.144  0.100  -.0415  0.467 
Capital accumulation rate, 1990 to 2000  Dln(k)  0.263  0.207  -0.217  0.674 
Control Variables 
         
1990 per capita GDP in thousands of US 
Dollars at PPP 
y  12.91  7.587  1.675  26.47 
Average years of total education for adults (age 
> 25, as of 1990) 
h  7.053  2.415  2.290  12.00 
1990 per capita capital assets in millions of US 
Dollars at PPP 
k  31.37  22.13  1.930  79.05 
1990 total GDP in trillions of US Dollars at PPP  Y  0.542  1.075  .0161  6.617 
Sample is the 44 countries listed in Table 1.   45 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Stability Indexes and Growth 
Variables. 
Samples  are  countries  listed  in  Table  1.    Numbers  in  parentheses  are  probability  levels  for  rejecting  the  null 
hypothesis of zero correlations coefficients 
Index of …  Maximally Inclusive 
Top 10 List (I) 
Minimally Inclusive 
Top 10 List (V) 
  GDP
L75 W  
GDP
E W  
GDP
L75 W  
GDP
E W  
Growth Measures         
-0.365  -0.302  -0.266  -0.382 
Per capita GDP growth, ‘90 to ‘00  Dln(y) 
(.02)  (.05)  (.08)  (.01) 
           
-0.309  -0.250  -0.290  -0.391  Total TFP  growth, ‘90 to ‘00  DTFP 
(.04)  (.10)  (.06)  (.01) 
           
-0.305  -0.262  -0.120  -0.211  Capital accumulation, ‘90 to ‘00  Dln(k) 
(.04)  (.09)  (.44)  (.17) 
 
Control Variables           
0.471  0.482  0.340  0.272  log of ’90 per capita GDP  ln(y) 
(.00)  (.00)  (.02)  (.07) 
           
0.500  0.541  0.271  0.235  log of ’90 per capita capital   ln(k) 
(.00)  (.00)  (.08)  (.12) 
           
0.324  0.422  0.318  0.285  Log of over 25 pop. av. years of 
schooling  ln(h) 
(.03)  (.00)  (.04)  (.06) 
           
.0907  0.244  0.382  0.467  Log of ‘90 total GDP  ln(Y) 
(.56)  (.11)  (.01)  (.00) 
           46 
Table 3: Regressions of Growth on Corporate Sector Stability Indexes  
 
OLS  regressions  of  growth  on  stability  and  controls.  Growth  is  1990  to  2000  per  capita  GDP 
growth, D D D Dln(y), total factor productivity growth, D D D DTFP, or per capita capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k).  
D D D DTFP is D D D Dln(y) – 0.3D D D Dln(k).  Stability indexes, ￿,  measure the proportion of ‘75 top ten firms still in 
the top ten in ‘96 or growing no slower than GDP from ‘75 to ‘96.  Control variables are the log of 
‘90  per  capita  GDP,  ln(y),  log  of  ’90  capital  assets  per  capita,  ln(k),  and  log  average  years  of 
education for adults, ln(h).  All financial variables are in ‘96 US dollars at purchasing power parity.   
 
Panel A: Regression with Typical Control Coefficients and Regression Statistics 
Stability index is equal-weighted and based on lists of top ten domestic private sector firms.    
     Dln(y)    DTFP   Dln(k)  
Constant    0.412 (.15)  0.442 (.03)  -.0984 (.82) 
Continued Importance, equal-weighted. 
GDP
E W   -0.373 (.00)  -0.269 (.00)  -0.345 (.07) 
Log of per capita GDP, 1990  ln(y)  .0845 (.44)  -.0539 (.50)  0.461 (.01) 
Log of average years of education  ln(h)  0.189 (.02)  0.160 (.01)  .0942 (.44) 
Log of per capita capital assets, 1990  ln(k)  -0.120 (.16)  -.000887 (.99)  -0.396 (.00) 
F-Statistic  F  3.77 (.01)  4.21 (.01)  2.97 (.03) 
Adjusted R-Squared  R
2  0.205    0.230    0.155   
Sample  N  44    44    44   
 
 
Panel B: Regression Coefficients of Corporate Stability 
Only coefficient estimates on corporate stability are shown. List I includes all available firms; List 
II includes all firms from List I except financial firms; List III is List I less financial and foreign 
controlled firms; List IV is List I excluding financial and state controlled firms; List V is List I 
excluding financial, foreign controlled and state controlled firms. 
D D D Dln(y)  D D D DTFP  D D D Dln(k)   
List of Top Ten Firms and Definition of Stability  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP
L75 W   -0.228  (.03)  -0.159  (.04)  -0.229  (.14) 
I   Maximally Inclusive 
GDP
E W   -0.265  (.06)  -0.215  (.03)  -0.166  (.42) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.254  (.02)  -0.165  (.04)  -0.297  (.06) 
II   No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   -0.281  (.06)  -0.208  (.06)  -0.240  (.28) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.279  (.01)  -0.179  (.02)  -0.335  (.03) 
III   No Financial or Foreign Controlled Firms 
GDP
E W   -0.392  (.01)  -0.270  (.01)  -0.408  (.05) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.220  (.04)  -0.162  (.04)  -0.193  (.23)  IV
  
No Financial or State Controlled Firms 
GDP
E W   -0.350  (.01)  -0.271  (.00)  -0.263  (.19) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.220  (.03)  -0.151  (.04)  -0.231  (.12) 
V  
No Financial, State, or Foreign Controlled 
Firms  GDP
E W   -0.373  (.00)  -0.269  (.00)  -0.345  (.07) 
Sample is countries listed in Table 1.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of 
zero coefficients.  47 
Table 4:  High and Low Income Countries 
OLS regressions of growth on stability and controls.   Growth is 1990 to 2000 per capita GDP 
growth, D D D Dln(y), total factor productivity growth, D D D DTFP, or per capita capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k).  
D D D DTFP is D D D Dln(y) – 0.3D D D Dln(k).  Stability indexes, ￿,  measure the proportion of ‘75 top ten firms still in 
the top ten in ‘96 or growing no slower than GDP from ‘75 to ‘96.  Control variables are the log of 
‘90  per  capita  GDP,  ln(y),  log  of  ’90  capital  assets  per  capita,  ln(k),  and  log  average  years  of 
education for adults, ln(h).  All financial variables are in ‘96 US dollars at purchasing power parity.  
Only coefficient estimates on corporate stability are shown. List I includes all available firms; List 
II includes all firms from List I except financial firms; List III is List I less financial and foreign 
controlled firms; List IV is List I excluding financial and state controlled firms; List V is List I 
excluding financial, foreign controlled and state controlled firms. 
 
Panel A: Coefficients on Corporate Stability Indexes in High Income Countries   
D D D Dln(y)  D D D DTFP  D D D Dln(k)   
List of Top Ten Firms and Definition of Stability  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP
L75 W   -0.102  (.43)  -.0882  (.43)  -.0455  (.73) 
I   Maximally Inclusive 
GDP
E W   -0.101  (.51)  -0.108  (.42)  .0209  (.90) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0965  (.45)  -.0768  (.49)  -.0658  (.62) 
II   No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   -.0916  (.56)  -.0752  (.58)  -.0547  (.74) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.137  (.34)  -0.110  (.37)  -.0890  (.54) 
III  
No Financial or Foreign Controlled 
Firms  GDP
E W   -0.158  (.39)  -0.132  (.41)  -.0887  (.64) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.193  (.09)  -0.159  (.10)  -0.113  (.35) 
IV  
No Financial or State Controlled 
Firms  GDP
E W   -0.232  (.12)  -0.208  (.11)  -.0800  (.61) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.209  (.05)  -0.169  (.07)  -0.134  (.24) 
V  
No Financial, State, or Foreign 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   -0.315  (.04)  -0.276  (.03)  -0.130  (.43) 
Sample includes 22 high-income countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
United States. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. 
 
Panel B: Coefficients on Corporate Stability in Low-Income Countries 
D D D Dln(y)  D D D DTFP  D D D Dln(k)   
List of Top Ten Firms and Definition of Stability  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP





E W   -0.256  (.30)  -0.195  (.20)  -0.203  (.64) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.382  (.02)  -0.229  (.03)  -0.509  (.10) 
II 
  
No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   -0.300  (.31)  -0.209  (.26)  -0.302  (.56) 
GDP
L75 W   -0.350  (.02)  -0.205  (.03)  -0.483  (.08) 
III 
  
No Financial or Foreign 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   -0.393  (.07)  -0.243  (.08)  -0.501  (.20) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0563  (.81)  -.0215  (.88)  -0.116  (.77) 
IV 
  
No Financial or State Controlled 
Firms  GDP
E W   -0.210  (.47)  -0.139  (.45)  -0.234  (.65) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0773  (.68)  -.0150  (.90)  -0.208  (.53) 
V 
  
No Financial, State, or Foreign 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   -0.219  (.34)  -0.108  (.46)  -0.369  (.36) 
Sample  includes  22  low-income  countries:  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Greece,  India,  Indonesia,  South  Korea, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Uruguay,  and 
Venezuela. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. 48 
Table 5:   Determinants of Stability 
Regressions are of the form: stability index = b b b b0 + b b b b1*stability determinant + b b b b2*ln(y) + b b b b3*ln(h) +  
b b b b4*ln(k) + e e e e. Dependent variables are labor or equal-weighted measures of the proportion of top ten 
‘75 firms that either remain in the top ten list for ’96 or grew no slower than  GDP from ’75 to ‘96.  
Control  variables  are  the  logs  of  ‘75  per  capita  GDP,  capital  assets,  and  average  years  of 
education for adults.  All financial variables are in 1996 US dollars at purchasing power parity.  
Only coefficient estimates on political economy variables are shown. List I includes all available 
firms; List II includes all firms from List I except financial firms; List III is List I less financial and 
foreign controlled firms; List IV is List I excluding financial and state controlled firms; List V is 
List I excluding financial, foreign controlled and state controlled firms. 
 
Panel A: Political Economy Variables as Determinants of Stability  
Political economy variables include government size (total final government consumption over 
GDP in ’75), inequality (‘75 GINI coefficient), a Common Law legal origin dummy, and red tape 
(days to obtain legal status as a new business in 1999).   
 
Government size  Inequality  Common Law  Red tape    
Continued importance List  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP
L75 W   -.0017  (.77)  -.0014  (.75)  -.109  (.09)  .0802  (.05) 
I   Maximally Inclusive 
GDP
E W   .0012  (.80)  -.0024  (.48)  -.0522  (.32)  .0514  (.14) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0031  (.58)  .00045  (.91)  -.131  (.03)  .0751  (.05) 
II   No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   -.0025  (.57)  -.0023  (.46)  -.0673  (.16)  .0414  (.19) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0033  (.56)  .0021  (.60)  -.112  (.07)  .0752  (.05)  III
  
No Financial or Foreign 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   -.0029  (.51)  .00003  (.99)  -.0407  (.41)  .0378  (.24) 
GDP
L75 W   .0118  (.06)  -.0071  (.12)  .0259  (.72)  -.0182  (.70)  IV
  
No Financial or State 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   .0018  (.71)  -.0030  (.39)  .0229  (.67)  -.0231  (.51) 
GDP
L75 W   .0113  (.09)  -.0059  (.23)  .0276  (.71)  -.0057  (.91)  V
  
No Financial, State, or 
Foreign Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   .0010  (.84)  -.0025  (.49)  .0123  (.83)  -.0002  (.99) 
Samples are as listed in Table 1 less Taiwan for government size, and those in Table 1 less Bolivia, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay for red 
tape delays and costs.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. 
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Panel B: Financial Development  Variables as Determinants of Stability 
Financial development variables include banking system (financial credit to private sector over 
GDP in 1975), stock market (total market capitalization over GDP in 1978), creditor rights, and 










Continued importance List  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP
L75 W   .00181  (.22)  -.0338  (.70)  -.00417  (.86)  -.0593  (.01) 
I   Maximally Inclusive 
GDP
E W   .00224  (.04)  -.0172  (.81)  -.00675  (.74)  -.0337  (.07) 
GDP
L75 W   .00126  (.37)  -.0467  (.57)  -.0141  (.54)  -.0557  (.01) 
II  No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   .00235  (.01)  -.0173  (.79)  -.00940  (.62)  -.0224  (.20) 
GDP
L75 W   .000993  (.48)  -.0381  (.65)  -.0119  (.60)  -.0564  (.01) 
III  
No Financial or Foreign 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   .00216  (.04)  -.00279  (.97)  -.00807  (.68)  -.0202  (.26) 
GDP
L75 W   .00215  (.18)  -.0332  (.73)  .0272  (.32)  -.0184  (.48) 
IV  
No Financial or State 
Controlled Firms  GDP
E W   .00228  (.05)  .0103  (.89)  .00792  (.71)  -.00100  (.96) 
GDP
L75 W   .00141  (.41)  -.110  (.28)  .0142  (.63)  -.0237  (.38) 
V  




E W   .00143  (.25)  -.0592  (.44)  -.0000109  (.99)  -.0145  (.48) 
Samples are as listed in Table 1 less Germany, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan for banking system size, those in Table 1 less 
Ireland and New Zealand for stock market size, those in Table 1 less Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela for creditor rights, and those in 
Table 1 less Bolivia, Chile for shareholder rights. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of 
zero coefficients.    
 
Panel C: Openness Variables as Determinants of Stability  
 Openness variables include foreign direct investment (FDI inflows as a fraction of GDP in 1975) 
and trade openness (imports plus exports as fraction of GDP in 1975).   
FDI Openness  Trade Openness 
Continued importance List  Coef.  p-val.  Coef.  p-val. 
GDP




E W   -.0162  (.44)  -.000390  (.45) 
GDP
L75 W   -.00552  (.84)  -.000131  (.83)  II 
  
No Financial Firms 
GDP
E W   -.0152  (.43)  -.000490  (.30) 
GDP
L75 W   -.000575  (.98)  -.0000882  (.89)  III 
  
No Financial or Foreign Controlled Firms 
GDP
E W   -.00224  (.91)  -.000393  (.42) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0533  (.07)  -.000430  (.54)  IV 
  
No Financial or State Controlled Firms 
GDP
E W   -.0209  (.31)  -.000554  (.30) 
GDP
L75 W   -.0763  (.02)  -.00107  (.15)  V 
  
No Financial, State, or Foreign Controlled Firms 
GDP
E W   -.0429  (.05)  -.00101  (.06) 
Samples are as listed in Table 1 less Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan for foreign direct 
investment, and those in Table 1 less Taiwan for trade openness. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null 
hypothesis of zero coefficients 50 
Table  6:  Regressions  of  Growth  on  Corporate  Sector  Stability  Indexes  and 
Institutional Environment Variables  
 
OLS regressions of growth on stability, institutional environment, and controls. Growth is 1990 to 
2000 per capita GDP growth, D D D Dln(y), total factor productivity growth, D D D DTFP, or per capita capital 
accumulation, D D D Dln(k).  D D D DTFP is D D D Dln(y) – 0.3D D D Dln(k).  Stability indexes, ￿, measure the proportion of 
‘75 top ten firms still in the top ten in ‘96 or growing no slower than GDP from ‘75 to ‘96.  Panel A 
uses stability based on List I, which includes all available firms. Panel B uses stability based on 
List V, which is List I excluding financial, foreign controlled and state controlled firms. Institution 
variables include a Common Law legal origin dummy, red tape (days to obtain legal status as a 
new business in 1999), government size (total final government consumption over GDP in ’75), 
banking system (financial credit to private sector over GDP in 1975), and trade openness (imports 
plus exports as fraction of GDP in 1975).  Control variables are the log of ‘90 per capita GDP, ln(y), 
log of ’90 capital assets per capita, ln(k), and log average years of education for adults, ln(h).  All 
financial variables are in ‘96 US dollars at purchasing power parity.   
 
Panel A.  Stability based on List I – Maximally inclusive top ten lists of leading businesses – 
including financial, foreign controlled, and sometime state controlled firms 
 
  Per capita GDP growth, D D D Dln(y)    Productivity growth, D D D DTFP   Capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k) 
stability,  -.204 -.253 -.222 -.202 -.212 -.214 -.141 -.170 -.154 -.136 -.148 -.142 -.211 -.275 -.226 -.219 -.213 -.238 
value-wtd  (.06)  (.02)  (.04)  (.06)  (.04)  (.05)  (.08)  (.03)  (.05)  (.07)  (.05)  (.07)  (.20)  (.09)  (.15)  (.17)  (.17)  (.15) 
common  .027          .061  .019          .041  .024          .067 
law  (.54)          (.30)  (.54)          (.34)  (.72)          (.46) 
red tape    .029        .059    .016        .037    .046        .076 
    (.28)        (.09)    (.44)        (.15)    (.26)        (.16) 
gov’t size      .000      -.001      .000      -.001      -.002      -.003 
      (.98)      (.72)      (.87)      (.85)      (.74)      (.63) 
banking        .001    -.001        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001 
dev.        (.23)    (.23)        (.14)    (.15)        (.75)    (.75) 
trade          .001  .000          .000  .000          .001  .001 
openness          (.08)  (.32)          (.16)  (.52)          (.11)  (.26) 
       
  Per capita GDP growth, D D D Dln(y)  Productivity growth, D D D DTFP  Capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k) 
stability,  -.238 -.265 -.256 -.214 -.216 -.197 -.194 -.211 -.209 -.172 -.185 -.167 -.146 -.182 -.154 -.142 -.104 -.100 
equal wtd. (.09)  (.06)  (.07)  (.13)  (.12)  (.18)  (.05)  (.04)  (.04)  (.09)  (.06)  (.11)  (.49)  (.39)  (.47)  (.51)  (.61)  (.65) 
common  .041          .078  .028          .052  .043          .088 
law  (.34)          (.19)  (.35)          (.23)  (.51)          (.34) 
red tape    .019        .056    .009        .035    .032        .070 
    (.49)        (.12)    (.63)        (.18)    (.44)        (.21) 
gov’t size      .001      -.001      .001      .000      -.001      -.003 
      (.87)      (.80)      (.69)      (.96)      (.80)      (.63) 
banking        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001 
dev.        (.29)    (.28)        (.20)    (.21)        (.72)    (.71) 
trade          .001  .000          .000  .000          .001  .001 
openness          (.13)  (.47)          (.25)  (.71)          (.12)  (.33) 51 
Table  6:  Regressions  of  Growth  on  Corporate  Sector  Stability  Indexes  and 
Institutional Environment Variables (continued) 
 
 
Panel B.  Stability based on List V – Minimally inclusive top ten lists – including only private 
sector non-financial domestically controlled businesses.   
 
  Per capita GDP growth, D D D Dln(y)  Productivity growth, D D D DTFP  Capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k) 
stability,  -.201 -.197 -.216 -.190 -.163 -.174 -.134 -.132 -.148 -.125 -.113 -.125 -.223 -.217 -.225 -.216 -.167 -.165 
value-wtd  (.04)  (.05)  (.04)  (.05)  (.11)  (.10)  (.06)  (.07)  (.05)  (.07)  (.13)  (.11)  (.13)  (.14)  (.15)  (.15)  (.27)  (.31) 
common  .051          .085  .036          .057  .049          .093 
law  (.22)          (.15)  (.23)          (.19)  (.44)          (.31) 
red tape    .010        .052    .003        .032    .025        .068 
    (.71)        (.14)    (.90)        (.21)    (.53)        (.21) 
gov’t size      .002      .000      .002      .001      .001      -.001 
      (.57)      (.98)      (.47)      (.85)      (.92)      (.81) 
banking        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001 
dev.        (.16)    (.18)        (.10)    (.12)        (.65)    (.66) 
trade          .001  .000          .000  .000          .001  .001 
openness          (.18)  (.68)          (.31)  (.92)          (.18)  (.46) 
                               
  Per capita GDP growth, D D D Dln(y)  Productivity growth, D D D DTFP  Capital accumulation, D D D Dln(k) 
stability,  -.353 -.347 -.351 -.328 -.308 -.304 -.252 -.250 -.252 -.231 -.230 -.228 -.336 -.325 -.330 -.324 -.259 -.253 
equal wtd. (.00)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.02)  (.02)  (.00)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.02)  (.08)  (.09)  (.08)  (.09)  (.18)  (.22) 
common  .052          .091  .037          .062  .050          .098 
law  (.19)          (.11)  (.20)          (.14)  (.42)          (.28) 
red tape    .006        .050    .000        .030    .022        .066 
    (.80)        (.14)    (.99)        (.22)    (.58)        (.22) 
gov’t size      .001      -.001      .001      .000      -.001      -.003 
      (.88)      (.74)      (.72)      (.89)      (.83)      (.63) 
banking        -.001    -.001        -.001    -.001        .000    -.001 
dev.        (.24)    (.23)        (.15)    (.15)        (.77)    (.73) 
trade          .000  .000          .000  .000          .001  .000 
openness          (.28)  (.87)          (.48)  (.85)          (.22)  (.53) 
 
 